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Rights Clinic (W&L IRC). He is a recognized scholar and advocate in the areas of statelessness, refugees, 
human rights, and migration, having published a number of articles on these topics, led research initia-
tives for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Open Society Foundations, and the 
Equal Rights Trust on statelessness in the Americas, directed UNHCR projects to identify and protect 
stateless persons in the United States and the Bahamas, and coordinated international human rights litiga-
tion against the Dominican Republic to defend the right to nationality in that country. He is a Steering 
Committee member of the Americas Network for Nationality and Statelessness and an Advisory Council 
member for the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion. At the W&L IRC, Baluarte represents stateless 
clients, like Miliyon Ethiopis, in their claims for protection in the United States and teaches immigration, 
citizenship and refugee law.
Miliyon is a stateless, failed asylum seeker residing in the United States. He 
initially sought refugee protection after he fled Ethiopia, where he had faced 
serious abuse because of his Eritrean ethnicity. Immigration authorities denied 
him asylum after concluding that the Ethiopian government’s deportation of his 
Eritrean father, the seizure of his family’s land and business, and the detention 
and torture of Miliyon himself constituted a property dispute not protected 
under U.S. refugee law. Miliyon fought this denial of protection over the next 
decade through various appeals processes but ultimately failed. At that point, 
he applied for a passport at the Ethiopian embassy in Washington, D.C. and 
resigned himself to return home and face whatever fate awaited him. Consular 
officials, however, refused to issue him a passport. Despite never having set foot 
in Eritrea or having any other connection to the country, Miliyon was told that 
he was Eritrean, not Ethiopian. He was informed that he had no right to return 
Protecting Stateless Refugees 
in the United States
David Baluarte
the brown journal of world affairs
David Baluarte
2
to Ethiopia, his country of birth and the only place he had ever lived. This led 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to declare 
Miliyon stateless. As a victim of discriminatory denationalization, Miliyon tried 
to renew his application for refugee protection. Notwithstanding the fact that 
Miliyon had endured this persecutory treatment, U.S. authorities once again 
denied his claim.
Miliyon’s failure to secure refugee protection in the United States reveals a 
series of deficiencies in U.S. asylum law and procedure as it applies to stateless 
persons. These deficiencies are in part related to the incomplete incorporation 
of international frameworks for the protection of refugees and stateless persons 
by the United States. Specifically, while the United States implemented its 
international refugee law obligations in the 1980 Refugee Act, it has neither 
signed the subsequent international treaties for the protection of stateless per-
sons nor enacted any domestic laws to fill this gap. As a result, U.S. law does 
not provide a definition of statelessness, a procedure for the determination of 
statelessness, or a framework for the protection of stateless persons. While U.S. 
asylum protection is available to stateless persons, the gap in the law with regard 
to statelessness leads many asylum adjudicators to misunderstand the unique 
circumstances that contribute to the persecution of stateless refugees. Moreover, 
stateless persons are subject to the same removal procedures as migrants with a 
nationality, and they are ordered to be removed after an asylum denial despite 
the fact that they have nowhere else in the world to go. 
This article proposes a more complete and nuanced consideration of state-
lessness in asylum adjudication procedures in the United States and the possibility 
of reopening previously denied asylum claims like Miliyon’s for this purpose. 
The article proceeds in four parts, beginning with a discussion of statelessness 
in the United States. Next, the article describes the international protection 
frameworks for both refugees and stateless persons and identifies important 
points of intersection between these frameworks. Then the article argues that 
discriminatory denationalization that renders a person stateless triggers refugee 
protection, thereby making victims of such deprivation eligible for asylum in 
the United States. The article concludes that stateless refugees like Miliyon 
should be able to reopen their previously denied asylum claims to make these 
arguments and pursue protection.
StateleSSneSS in the United StateS
A stateless person is one who is not a national of any country under the 
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operation of its laws.1 While this is an individualized legal determination that 
can be technical in nature, the lived experience of a stateless person is not at all 
a technical matter. Untethered from the international order of nation-states, 
stateless persons have no home anywhere in the world. This is particularly 
important to understand as the tenor of global discourse about unauthorized 
migration has become harsh and unsympathetic. 
As might be expected, stateless persons without authorization to reside in 
the United States live in the shadows, avoiding contact with the criminal justice 
system and immigration authorities. If stateless migrants like Miliyon do come 
into contact with the immigration system, they are treated in the same manner 
as any other migrant; if they are found removable, they are mandatorily detained. 
Because they cannot ac-
tually be removed from 
the country, as no other 
nation will accept them, 
they may face prolonged 
detention, but they will 
eventually be released 
to a life on parole. Sepa-
rated permanently from their families abroad, they live their lives under the 
constant scrutiny of immigration officials with the discretion to grant or deny 
their requests to work legally, and the authority to re-detain them.2 The stateless 
legal limbo in the United States is a lonely and precarious existence.
The Center for Migration Studies (CMS), a nonpartisan, New York-based 
think tank, recently conducted a study that estimated and profiled the population 
of people in the United States who may be stateless, with eye-opening results.3 
CMS recognized at the outset that U.S. law does not define statelessness and 
that the U.S. government does not make any specific effort to determine who is 
stateless or count those who fall under this category. Through a rigorous mixed 
method of quantitative and qualitative analysis, CMS developed a comprehensive 
set of profiles of migrants who are potentially stateless, or potentially at risk of 
statelessness, and provided an estimate of that population in the United States. 
CMS intentionally qualified the terms “stateless” and “at risk of statelessness” 
with the term potentially in order to capture all people of a national, ethnic, or 
religious background who could be stateless. CMS then used large, government-
maintained databases to estimate the population of people potentially of concern. 
The contributions of this important work are at least threefold. First, the 
comprehensive nature of the study, by first collecting the many profiles of global 
As might be expected, stateless persons 
without authorization to reside in the 
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statelessness and then matching them with existing databases of foreign-born 
persons in the United States, is quite stunning. With the increasing global aware-
ness of statelessness in recent years, numerous marginalized ethnic and religious 
groups are now understood to have precarious nationality rights. For example, 
Syrian Kurds forced to flee the protracted conflict in Syria risk statelessness, as 
do Bahamians of Haitian ancestry in the Caribbean nation just 50 miles off the 
coast of Florida. While an exact count of the U.S. stateless population is impos-
sible, matching these profiles with the U.S. foreign-born population provides 
a much clearer sense of the likely contours of the stateless population in the 
United States than has ever been possible before. 
Second, using innovative statistical modeling, CMS was able to estimate 
that there are approximately 218,000 foreign-born persons in the United States 
who are potentially stateless or at risk of statelessness. While the actual number 
of stateless persons in the United States is probably much lower than 218,000, 
the study suggests that the population is likely larger than the previous UNHCR 
estimate of just 4,000 stateless people. The people identified in the CMS study 
live in all 50 states of the United States, and they represent every major region 
of the world. Notably, more than half of the estimated population were identi-
fied in Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) data, one 
of the two principal data sources analyzed by CMS. This suggests that a large 
portion of the U.S. stateless population are recognized refugees, which means 
that they have immigration status and are on a path to gaining U.S. citizenship. 
Finally, while most foreign-born people who are possibly stateless or at risk 
of statelessness are refugees and protected under U.S. law, CMS discovered that 
a substantial portion of the population does not appear in the WRAPS data and 
may have no status in the United States. This population was identified though 
an analysis of American Community Survey (ACS) data, collected annually by 
the U.S. Census Bureau. Napkin math based on the CMS data analysis provides 
that roughly 80,000 people who are potentially stateless or at risk of statelessness 
appear in the ASC data set and do not appear in the WRAPS data set.4 This 
suggests that about 40 percent of the U.S. stateless population is not protected 
by refugee status and may be in need of international protection. This group is 
of particular concern because it is most in need of legislative action to define 
statelessness and create the protective framework that is currently absent. This 
realization should prompt a sustained effort to pass such legislation.
Notably, a well-developed proposal for a stateless person protection mecha-
nism has been included in every iteration of the Refugee Protection Act (RPA), 
which Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) has introduced to the U.S. Congress nearly 
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every legislative cycle since 2010.5 While the RPA has never garnered sufficient 
support as a stand-alone bill to reach the floor of the Senate for a vote, it was 
included in the bi-partisan Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Im-
migration Modernization Act of 2013 (SB 744).6 The Senate passed SB 744 in 
2013, but the legislation was never presented for a vote in the lower house of 
Congress due to political opposition to progressive comprehensive immigration 
reform. That is the closest that United States has ever come to passing a stateless 
person protection mechanism into law. 
While the harsh political landscape for immigrants in the United States 
today makes the near-miss reform bill of 2013 seem utopian, the statelessness 
provision nevertheless merits close consideration. The proposed mechanism 
would have created a definition for “stateless person” to mirror the definition set 
forth in the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (Statelessness 
Convention).7 It would have also granted a procedure for the determination of 
statelessness to guide immigration authorities in identifying who is “not con-
sidered a national under the operation of the laws of any country.”8 Basic legal 
protection and immigration status for individuals determined to be “stateless 
person(s)”, would also have been provided by the proposed law. Specifically, upon 
receiving stateless status, individuals would receive work authorization, become 
eligible for travel documents, have the ability to become Lawful Permanent 
Residents, and ultimately have the opportunity to apply for U.S. citizenship—a 
permanent resolution to their stateless status.9 The proposed statelessness pro-
tection mechanism would potentially solve the situation of the vast majority of 
stateless persons in the United States, who are currently unprotected. 
That this statelessness protection mechanism is situated in a broader legisla-
tive proposal titled the Refugee Protection Act is no coincidence—it highlights 
the important relationship, both legally and factually, between stateless persons 
and refugees. The following section will elaborate on the important relationship 
between these two categories of internationally protected peoples to set up a 
discussion of how asylum protection can be maximized to encompass the state-
less population in the United States.
RefUgee PRotection and StateleSSneSS
Having no nationality under the laws of any country, stateless persons lack many 
legal protections afforded to citizens. Refugees also lack a range of interrelated 
human rights protections, facing unjustifiable abuse in their home countries. 
The international community recognized statelessness and refugee status as two 
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distinct forms of international protection after World War II amid efforts to 
address a widespread problem of vulnerable people who lacked protection at the 
national level. However, there was a meaningful overlap between those who were 
considered stateless and those who were considered refugees in postwar Europe. 
For example, Jewish people stripped of their nationality in Nazi Germany were 
left stateless and were also considered refugees and qualified as such because 
they had suffered physical brutality on account of their religion. It is important 
to understand this historical overlap, inasmuch as it illuminates an overlap in 
the legal protections that have developed over time. Moreover, this observation 
about the overlap in legal protections serves as the foundation for the argument 
advanced in this article that refugee protection in the form of asylum should be 
interpreted to protect stateless persons in certain circumstances.
In the wake of World War II, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries charged 
with designing the global refugee protection framework produced the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).10 Notably, as part 
of that same charge, the Conference was instructed to devise a protocol for the 
protection of stateless persons that would operate together with the Refugee 
Convention. However, the protection of stateless persons was deferred at that 
time and ultimately led to the promulgation of the 1954 Statelessness Conven-
tion, which mirrors the Refugee Convention in most of its substantive provisions. 
These protection frameworks for refugees and stateless persons were refined and 
amplified with the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention and the 1961 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, respectively. Notwithstanding 
the relatively equal treatment at the level of international normative develop-
ment, nations have generally understood the problem of refugee protection to 
be more pressing than the challenges faced by stateless persons. Accordingly, 
while the Refugee Convention has steadily accrued signatories over time and 
become the default framework for asylum and refugee protection around the 
world, the Statelessness Convention has struggled to garner broad ratification. 
The UNHCR, which has a mandate to protect both refugees and stateless 
persons under these respective convention frameworks, has worked intensely 
in recent years to give greater visibility to global statelessness, with the ultimate 
goal of eradication.11 
Both the history of the Refugee and Statelessness Conventions as well as the 
overall structure and specific provisions of those international treaties suggest that 
the refugee protection framework was developed with statelessness protection in 
mind. Indeed, the legal frameworks for refugees and stateless persons reinforce 
this understanding. For example, the refugee definition provides two parallel 
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paths to protection by stating that a refugee is a person who flees persecution in 
her country of nationality or a non-national who flees persecution in her country 
of last habitual residence. This second formulation, which protects refugees who 
have “no nationality” and flee persecution in their country of last habitual resi-
dence, was clearly envisioned to provide refugee protection to stateless persons. 
Naturally, stateless persons are not protected as refugees by merely establish-
ing their statelessness; rather, they must demonstrate persecution on account 
of one of the five protected characteristics (race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, or member-
ship in a particular 
social group) just like 
any national seeking 
refugee protection. 
It is the Stateless-
ness Convention that 
envisions protection 
for people based on 
their stateless status 
alone, but the rela-
tively sluggish adoption of this form of international protection should not 
deter advocates for the protection of stateless persons from understanding their 
plight as refugees. On the contrary, because refugee protection is often the only 
means available for the protection of stateless persons available at the national 
level, advocates must look to those procedures in order to ensure the human 
rights of stateless persons.
The United States signed the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention, 
and in 1980, the U.S. legislature passed the Refugee Act to codify refugee protec-
tion and bring the country into conformity with its international obligations.12 
It was the 1980 Refugee Act that created both the system for resettlement of 
refugees from abroad as well as the asylum system, which provides a path to 
refugee protection for forced migrants present in the United States.13 While 
U.S. courts have established that statelessness in and of itself does not qualify 
a person for refugee protection, they have identified a variety of circumstances 
in which stateless persons may suffer harm that rises to the level of persecution 
on account of their stateless status. Most often, this is cast as persecution on 
account of race or religion, as in the cases of Roma in Europe, Palestinians in 
the Middle East, or even Ethiopians of Eritrean descent like Miliyon. The next 
section explores the specific circumstances in which U.S. courts have extended 
While U.S. courts have established that 
statelessness in and of itself does not qual-
ify a person for refugee protection, they 
have identified a variety of circumstances 
in which stateless persons may suffer 
harm that rises to the level of persecu-
tion on account of their stateless status. 
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refugee protection to forced migrants who have been discriminatorily stripped 
of their nationality and left stateless.
diScRiminatoRy denationalization aS PeRSecUtion
International refugee law protects people who have been discriminatorily 
deprived of their nationality and left stateless.14 In the United States, a series of 
cases has emerged concerning whether similar protections should be afforded 
domestically. Specifically, the Seventh, Sixth, and Ninth U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have posited that discriminatory denationalization that leaves someone 
stateless may constitute persecution for the purposes of obtaining asylum 
protection. However, such courts’ interpretations of asylum law are only binding 
in the geographic regions in which they exercise jurisdiction, meaning their 
decisions do not have a national effect. In each of these three cases, the Circuit 
Court in question sent the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
the highest immigration appeals court within the Department of Justice, for 
further consideration of this question. However, the BIA has so far declined to 
issue a precedent decision on this matter, leaving many denationalized stateless 
persons in the United States with no clear path to protection. A review of these 
three cases gives a good sense of what is at stake.
The first court to take up this question was the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in Haile v. Gonzalez (Haile I), which involved consolidated 
cases of two ethic Eritreans born in Ethiopia who sought asylum based on 
Ethiopia’s arbitrary expulsion and denationalization of approximately 75,000 
persons of Eritrean ethnicity.15 In 2005, the Seventh Circuit observed that the 
same immigration judge in each case had denied asylum to the seeker based on 
his understanding that a country has a sovereign right to grant or deny citizenship 
as it sees fit, even in the case of discriminatory denationalization.16 In both cases, 
the asylum seekers had escaped from Ethiopia without personally suffering any 
physical mistreatment, but were effectively stripped of their Ethiopian citizen-
ship and thus left stateless.17 The Seventh Circuit found it “arguable that such a 
program of denationalization and deportation is in fact a particularly acute form 
of persecution.”18 Because the court believed that the BIA should be the first 
to address this legal question, it remanded the case for further consideration.19
While the BIA was reconsidering the questions remanded by the Seventh 
Circuit in Haile I, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had occa-
sion to review a similar case in 2009. In Mengstu v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the case of an ethnic Eritrean woman who fled Ethiopia during the 
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massive campaign of forced expulsion and who had been denationalized during 
her efforts to renew her identity documents.20 While the immigration judge 
in that case also found that the asylum seeker had not suffered persecution, 
the Ninth Circuit, “[l]ike the Seventh Circuit, [found] it ‘arguable that such 
a program of denationalization and deportation is in fact a particularly acute 
form of persecution,’ and … remand[ed] to the agency to answer this question 
in the first instance.’”21 
The very next year, Haile v. Holder (Haile II) returned to the Seventh Cir-
cuit after the BIA again denied one of the previous petitioners’ applications for 
asylum.22 According to the Seventh Circuit, the BIA had denied the application 
after finding that “while denationalization can be ‘a harbinger of persecution,’ 
the immigration judge ‘must look at the circumstances surrounding the loss of 
nationality or citizenship and then, on an individual basis, determine whether 
these circumstances rise to the level of persecution.’”23 The Seventh Circuit 
found it troubling that the BIA had failed to provide any guidance on what such 
“circumstances” might be and that, in support of its “denationalization plus” 
formulation, it had given the example of Soviet citizens who were denational-
ized with the fall of the Soviet Union and then became Russian citizens. The 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the example of denationalization provided 
by the BIA would not constitute persecution but distinguished the case before 
it because the denationalization in question had resulted in statelessness.24 The 
court found that “[i]f Ethiopia denationalized the petitioner because of his Er-
itrean ethnicity, it did so because of hostility to Eritreans,” and concluded that 
“if to be made stateless is persecution, as we believe, … then to be deported to 
the country that made you stateless and continues to consider you stateless is 
to be subjected to persecution even if the country will allow you to remain and 
will not bother you as long as you behave yourself.”25 
While this decision of the Seventh Circuit provides a clear rule for that 
jurisdiction, its exchange with the BIA on two separate occasions suggests that 
this is not a rule that the BIA is applying throughout the United States. More-
over, without any published guidance from the BIA, immigration courts and 
asylum officers are likely applying different rules in the variety of denationaliza-
tion cases that come before them. Indeed, a case arising from a very different 
country context led another U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal to seek clarification 
from the BIA on this precise question.
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded a case 
to the BIA to address the specific question of “whether ethnically motivated 
citizenship revocation that results in statelessness is persecution” in a case in-
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volving ethnic Russians from Estonia.26 In that case, one of the petitioners lost 
her Estonian nationality when Estonia gained independence from the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The petitioner had been left stateless for a period of two years, 
after which she regained Estonian nationality in exchange for her vote in an 
election. The Sixth Circuit found that “[e]ven though the IJ did not believe that 
[Petitioner] Stserba had shown any adverse consequences which arose or which 
affected her as a consequence of her two years or less of lost citizenship, Stserba 
may have suffered past persecution simply because she became stateless due to 
her ethnicity.”27 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further consideration 
from the BIA, and whatever the resolution of that individual case, no public 
guidance has yet been published.
The disinclination of the BIA to exercise its authority to issue a rule of 
national application complicates the efforts of stateless asylum seekers in the 
United States who would otherwise be able to escape their legal limbo with 
refugee protection. The case of Miliyon, whose plea for help after he was discrimi-
natorily denationalized by the Ethiopian government and declared stateless by 
the UNHCR has been ignored by the BIA, clearly evidences this disinclination. 
Moreover, Miliyon faces an additional legal hurdle because he must demonstrate 
not only that his discriminatory denationalization qualifies him for asylum, but 
also that this change in circumstances is sufficiently significant to reopen his 
long-denied claim for asylum.
Renewing a claim foR aSylUm aS a StateleSS PeRSon
When a stateless migrant is denied asylum by U.S. immigration authorities, the 
would-be refugee is ordered to be removed from the country. The order is issued 
despite the migrant’s 
statelessness, which in 
most cases means that 
there is no country 
in the world that will 
accept the migrant’s 
r e t u r n .  So m e w h a t 
counterintuitively, the 
willingness or ability of a country to readmit a migrant found removable from the 
United States is not a hinderance to a deportation decision.28 This leads to some 
stateless persons spending extended periods of time in immigration detention as 
immigration officials engage in futile efforts to remove them to countries that 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the 
willingness or ability of a country 
to readmit a migrant found remov-
able from the United States is not a 
hinderance to a deportation decision.
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will not accept them. Once released, the stateless migrant lives a life on parole 
at the whim of immigration authorities.29 Similarly, when migrants discover 
their statelessness after they have been ordered removed, as was the case with 
Miliyon, they must meet a very difficult burden of proof to convince immigration 
authorities to reconsider their asylum claim in light of this new evidence. In 
order to renew a failed claim of asylum, a would-be refugee must convince the 
BIA that circumstances have changed in the country of nationality in a way that 
is material to the claim for protection. Commonly, these altered circumstances 
can be a change in government or an internal armed conflict that affects the 
socio-political situation in a manner that threatens a migrant seeking protection 
in the United States. While this is usually how asylum seekers demonstrate 
changed circumstances, there is nothing in the law that suggests that these are 
the only kinds of changes that merit reopening an asylum case. There should 
be little doubt that a deprivation of nationality that leaves someone stateless, 
which is the sovereign act that literally excises a citizen from the body politic, 
constitutes a change in circumstances in the country of nationality. Moreover, 
for the reasons described by the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits above, this is 
a change in circumstances that goes to the heart of a claim for refugee protection. 
While largely untested, this argument could provide stateless migrants with a 
path to renewed consideration of their asylum claims.
At present, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is considering 
Miliyon’s case; examining his argument that his discriminatory denationalization 
and resulting statelessness constitute a change in circumstances in Ethiopia that 
warrants reopening his claim for asylum. While this case is specifically about 
Miliyon, it should be understood in the broader context of the BIA’s resistance 
to an interpretation of U.S. law that would provide stateless migrants with a 
clearer path to refugee protection. Miliyon is a member of the organization 
“United Stateless,” the first affinity group whose membership is made up of 
stateless migrants in the United States who have come together to expose the 
injustices they endure and advocate for a more humane existence for stateless 
persons.30 For this group, Miliyon’s case represents a hope that asylum could 
provide a significant proportion of stateless migrants with a path out of their 
legal limbo. Should the Fourth Circuit recognize the validity of Miliyon’s argu-
ment to reopen his case as well as his underlying claim for asylum, the United 
States would take a meaningful step towards fulfilling its duty, as a member of 
the global community, to eradicate statelessness. AW
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